Should the unanticipated slowing of infl ation that has occurred since early 2012 raise doubts about the reliability of infl ation forecasts? We answer this question by conducting a few exercises with a common macroeconomic forecasting model. Our results indicate that even though infl ation turned out to be much lower than forecasted, it still fell well within a normal range of uncertainty, and most of the deviation from the original forecast was a response to other economic developments.
Should the unanticipated fall in infl ation raise doubts about the reliability of common forecasting models-such as those used at the Cleveland Fed-and projections of infl ation for the period ahead? The answer to those questions depends on the magnitude of the surprise relative to historical norms and the ability of the models to explain (after the fact) the slowing of infl ation. Magnitude matters because the outlook for infl ation and other macroeconomic variables is always uncertain, and even though the actual path of infl ation has deviated from the model forecast, it may still fall within the normal range of uncertainty around the path the model projected.
The ability of models to explain the deviation of actual infl ation from the forecast matters because it refl ects how well the model is constructed. Infl ation may have followed a path different from the one expected because the economy experienced surprise movements in some of the determinants of infl ation that are built into the model, such as GDP growth or unemployment. Assuming these determinants return to behaving as expected, the model's forecasts will match actual infl ation outcomes more closely.
To the extent the model cannot attribute the deviation to movement in these determinants, we might worry about its reliability and its projections for the future.
Our results indicate that the surprising decline in infl ation shouldn't be raising doubts about model reliability and future projections of infl ation. In our analysis, the gap between actual infl ation and forecasts made in early 2012 falls well within the normal range of uncertainty. In addition, the model explains most of the falloff in infl ation as a response to other economic developments. As a result, the unanticipated falloff in infl ation should simply serve as a useful reminder of the uncertainty that always surrounds forecasts. Figure 1 shows the sharp slowing of actual PCE infl ation that has occurred since early 2012. Measured on a 12-month basis, PCE infl ation plummeted from 2.5 percent in January 2012 to 1.2 percent in August 2013. Although some of the deceleration in PCE prices has been driven by energy prices, measures of the underlying trend in PCE prices that are either less affected or not affected by energy prices have also slowed signifi cantly. Trimmed-mean PCE infl ation dropped from 2.1 percent in January 2012 to 1.3 percent in August 2013, and core PCE infl ation declined from 2.0 percent to 1.2 percent over the same period.
Recent Evolution of Infl ation
While the FOMC tends to focus on PCE measures of infl ation, the CPI can also be useful for judging price trends. Figures 2 and 3 show that CPI measures of infl ation have also slowed since the beginning of 2012, although the decline in some underlying measures of the trend in CPI prices hasn't been as great as the falloff observed in underlying measures of PCE infl ation.
2 Measured on a 12-month basis, CPI infl ation dropped from 2.9 percent in January 2012 to 1.5 percent in August 2013. Over the same period, 16 percent trimmed-mean CPI infl ation fell from 2.1 percent to 1.3 percent, while core CPI infl ation declined more modestly, from 2.3 percent to 1.8 percent. However, median CPI infl ation has changed much less, edging down from 2.3 percent to 2.1 percent.
Model-Based Assessment
To more formally assess the implications of the recent decline in infl ation for infl ation modeling and forecasting, we use a type of forecasting model (known as a Bayesian vector autoregression) that is very common in macroeconomics. In this analysis, to abstract from some of the temporary variation in infl ation that can arise due to noisy food and energy prices, we focus on core infl ation. Accordingly, the model includes core PCE and CPI infl ation and eight other macroeconomic variables (table 1) that likely have some bearing on core infl ation. The model consists of equations relating the current value of each variable to past values of all variables.
3 We estimate the model using data ending in the fi rst quarter of 2012, when core PCE infl ation peaked. Although we focus our discussion on core PCE infl ation, our model yields results for core CPI infl ation that are very similar.
We begin by using the estimated model and data through 2012:Q1 to forecast core PCE infl ation from 2012:Q2 to 2013:Q2. The model projects the most likely path of infl ation over that period and estimates confi dence bands around the most likely path. We report 70 percent confi dence bands as a measure of the historically normal level of uncertainty around the forecast. Figure 4 provides the baseline forecast of core PCE infl ation, the 70 percent confi dence band around it, and the path infl ation actually followed. The baseline projection shows core PCE infl ation dipping to about 1.6 percent by the end of 2012 and then gradually moving up toward 2 percent, broadly consistent with the forecasts the FOMC and SPF made in early 2012. Although the baseline forecast tracked actual infl ation pretty well through about the middle of 2012, over the remainder of 2012 and the fi rst half of 2013 actual infl ation proved to be well below the model's forecast. Clearly, if we defi ne a surprise as any deviation of actual infl ation from the forecast produced with what was known in early 2012, our forecasting model indicates the decline in core PCE infl ation has been a surprise.
However, relative to historical uncertainty surrounding the forecast, the departure of actual infl ation from the projected path hasn't been especially large. Consistent with our previous observation that forecasts are always uncertain, the path of actual infl ation fell well within the 70 percent confi dence band around the baseline forecast. So the magnitude of the infl ation surprise isn't very big by historical norms.
After the fact, how well does the model explain the falloff in infl ation? To answer this question, we construct another forecast of infl ation from 2012:Q2 through 2013:Q2, taking account of the actual paths of all other variables of the model over this forecast horizon. This forecast can be described as "conditional" because it is produced by feeding into the model the actual data (over the forecast horizon) for all the other variables of the model instead of the forecasts of those variables, which were incorporated in the baseline projection. Figure 5 provides the conditional forecast, a 70 percent confi dence band around it, and the path that infl ation actually followed. The forecast of infl ation conditioned on the actual values of the other model variables closely tracks the actual evolution of core PCE infl ation in 2012 and 2013. The close match between the conditional forecast and the actual path of infl ation means that, to a large degree, the falloff of infl ation that occurred from early 2012 through mid-2013 was indeed a systematic response to other developments in the economy, which the model succeeds in capturing.
To determine which specifi c developments in the economy have driven infl ation lower, we next use our forecasting model to assess the contributions of each variable to the path of infl ation from 2012:Q2 through 2013:Q2.
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Computing these contributions is complicated by the fact that macroeconomic variables interact with one another. For example, changes in GDP affect unemployment, and changes in unemployment affect GDP. As a result, to assess the contributions of these variables to the path of infl ation, we need to use the model to isolate the changes unique to each variable-that is, isolate the "shocks" to each variable in the model. We then estimate the effect of each shock on core PCE infl ation to obtain the contribution of each variable. We consider two counterfactual exercises (results shown in fi gure 6). The fi rst refl ects the effects of the model's estimated shocks to real GDP, payroll employment, and the unemployment rate over the 2012:Q2-2013:Q2 period and just information through 2012:Q1 (coupled with forecasts for subsequent periods) for all other variables. The second refl ects the effects of the model's estimated shocks to all variables except core PCE infl ation. For comparison, the baseline forecast, which uses only information as of 2012:Q1, and the path of actual infl ation are also shown.
The model-based decomposition shows that much of the falloff in core PCE infl ation since early 2012 has been a response to movements in other variables. Some of the falloff has been due to the evolution of GDP growth, employment, and unemployment, which is refl ected in fi gure 6 by the forecast that includes shocks to those variables lying below the baseline forecast.
Some of the decline in infl ation, particularly in 2013, is due to movements in other model variables, including labor costs and import and energy prices, refl ected by the forecast with all shocks except to PCE infl ation lying below the forecast with shocks only to GDP, employment, and unemployment. The combined impact of shocks to GDP growth, employment, unemployment, labor costs, etc., is represented by the distance between the baseline forecast and the forecast with all shocks except to PCE infl ation. This impact is clearly sizable, particularly as of mid-2013.
However, a smaller portion of the falloff in core PCE infl ation cannot be explained by shocks to other variables; this portion is instead due to a shock to infl ation. The effect of the shock to infl ation is refl ected in the gap between the path of actual infl ation and the forecast that refl ects shocks to every variable except to core PCE infl ation.
Our fi nding that some of the falloff in infl ation in 2013 is due to an infl ation-specifi c shock is consistent with the conclusions of the July 2013 Monetary Policy Report, according to which some of the decline in infl ation in 2013 is likely transitorythat is, a temporary movement not likely to last, consistent with the notion of an infl ation-specifi c shock in our model.
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Looking Ahead Based on this analysis, the surprising fall in infl ation that has occurred since early 2012 should not add to doubts about the reliability of common forecasting models. The shortfall of infl ation relative to the forecast falls well within the normal range of uncertainty, and our model is able to explain most of the decline in infl ation as a response to other economic developments. Instead, the unanticipated falloff of infl ation highlights the uncertainty that always surrounds forecasts.
We complete our analysis by using a current version of the model, estimated with data through 2013:Q2, to forecast the most likely path of core PCE infl ation from the second half of 2013 through 2015. As indicated in fi gure 7, our model projects that core PCE infl ation has bottomed out and will gradually rise over time toward the FOMC's long-term infl ation goal of 2 percent.
Of course, as we have emphasized, forecasts are always uncertain, as refl ected in fi gure 7's confi dence bands around the projection. Infl ation could well prove to be higher or lower than our model projects today, just as has happened over the past couple of years.
Looking beyond the model gives us some comfort in projecting a gradual rise in infl ation. In particular, as we noted earlier, measures of underlying infl ation in the CPI haven't declined as much since early 2012 as corresponding measures of PCE infl ation. Moreover, this year, CPI measures have shown clearer signs of hitting bottom, with infl ation in the Cleveland Fed's median CPI very stable at just over 2 percent. 2. It is normally the case that CPI infl ation exceeds PCE infl ation, refl ecting some signifi cant differences in the construction of the measures. The PCE price index and the CPI use different formulas for computing the average price change and cover somewhat different types of spending. In addition, specifi c item weights and some prices differ between the indexes. The most recently available quantitative decomposition of differences available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis indicates that, in the fi rst half of 2013, the biggest driver of the gap between CPI and PCE infl ation was the difference in the weights attached to individual items in the price indexes.
3. The PCE and CPI infl ation variables enter the model as deviations from a long-run trend, defi ned as the survey-based long-run (5-to 10-year-ahead) PCE infl ation expectations series from the Federal Reserve Board of Governor's FRB/US econometric model. In autoregressive models, specifying infl ation as a deviation from trend has been found to improve forecast accuracy (see, for example, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) , Clark (2011), and Zaman (2013) ). Nevertheless, our results are not sensitive to this aspect of the model; we obtain similar results for models with the price variables entered in simple growth rates or log levels.
4. In the reported conditional forecast, we feed in actual values of core CPI infl ation. However, we obtain essentially the same result if we don't condition on the actual evolution of the CPI infl ation measure. 5. To be precise and technical, we use the model to conduct a historical decomposition.
6. More specifi cally, the report states: "The very low rate of infl ation in the fi rst half of 2013 partly refl ects energy, but other infl ation rates have been subdued. Especially low infl ation refl ects other special factors (medical prices, nonmarket prices) that are expected to be transitory."
